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Abstract
The VOEvent standard provides a means of describing transient celestial events in a machine-readable format. This is
an essential step towards analysing and, where appropriate, responding to the large volumes of transients which will be
detected by future large scale surveys. The VOEvent Transport Protocol (VTP) defines a system by which VOEvents
may be disseminated to the community. We describe the design and implementation of Comet, a freely available, open
source implementation of VTP. We use Comet as a base to explore the performance characteristics of the VTP system,
in particular with reference to meeting the requirements of future survey projects. We describe how, with the aid of
simple extensions to VTP, Comet can help users filter high-volume streams of VOEvents to extract only those which are
of relevance to particular science cases. Based on these tests and on the experience of developing Comet, we derive a
number of recommendations for future refinements of the VTP standard.
Keywords: VOEvent, Astronomical transients, Time domain astrophysics, Network protocol design
1. Introduction
Exploring the astrophysical time domain through timely
follow-up observations of transient and variable sources of-
fers the potential of many and varied scientific results.
However, achieving these results requires a fast and reli-
able way of disseminating sufficient information about new
transients to appropriate follow-up facilities.
Mechanisms for distributing news of transient events
already exist: both the NASA Gamma-ray Coordinates
Network1 (GCN) and The Astronomer’s Telegram2 have
long track records of enabling transient astronomy. How-
ever, the next generation of large-scale survey telescopes
such as Gaia, SKA and LSST promise an increase by sev-
eral orders of magnitude in the rate of transients being
reported. The sheer volume of events presents a scalability
challenge: it is no longer practical for even large teams
of astronomers to consider reading, understanding and re-
sponding to these notifications manually. Automation is
essential. Furthermore, the diverse nature of these tran-
sient hunting facilities—covering not just electromagnetic
gamut from low-frequency radio telescopes to space based
X- and γ-ray monitors, but also other types of instrumen-
tation such as gravitational waves detectors—means that a
flexible and adaptable machine-readable mechanism must
be adopted for describing transients.
The International Virtual Observatory Alliance (IVOA)
has developed the VOEvent3 (Seaman et al., 2011) standard
Email address: j.swinbank@uva.nl (John Swinbank)
1http://gcn.gsfc.nasa.gov/
2http://www.astronomerstelegram.org/
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to address these issues. VOEvent provides a standardized,
machine- and human-readable way of describing a wide
range of transient astronomical phenomena. An individual
VOEvent document (or “packet”) describes a particular
transient event, providing not only information about what
has been observed and how the observations were made,
but also making it possible for the author to include a
scientific motivation for why this particular event is inter-
esting. Furthermore, a VOEvent may cite other VOEvents,
providing more information about a given transient or, if
necessary, superseding or retracting an earlier message.
VOEvents are published as XML (Bray et al., 2008)
documents which should be in compliance with schema
(Gau et al., 2012; Peterson et al., 2012) produced by the
IVOA. Working in XML enables VOEvent to make ex-
tensive use of other relevant IVOA standards and enables
convenient processing with a wide range of commercial and
open-source software.
The VOEvent standard defines the structure and con-
tent of a VOEvent packet, but it does not describe a mech-
anism by which the author of a VOEvent may distribute it
to potentially interested recipients. This transport agnosti-
cism is provides the maximum possible flexibility for indi-
vidual projects to disseminate events by whatever means
best meets their science goals. However, a baseline specifi-
cation for a simple transport protocol is of value in terms
of providing a common starting point for building inter-
national VOEvent distribution networks (Williams et al.,
2012). The VOEvent Transport Protocol (VTP; Allan and
Denny, 2009) is now seeing widespread adoption as such a
baseline.
This manuscript describes Comet, an implementation
of all the components necessary for interacting with VTP
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Figure 1: An overview of the passage of a VOEvent through a
VTP network. The network roles and connection types described in
§2 are all represented. Arrows indicate the direction of data flow;
their style represents the type of connection. The dashed arrow
is an author-to-broker connection, while solid arrows are broker-to-
subscriber connections (which are equivalent to broker-to-broker).
First the event is sent by an author to a single broker. This broker
then distributes it to all of its subscribers, which may include other
brokers, which, in turn, redistribute the event until every entity on the
network has received a single copy: de-duplication, where necessary,
is applied as discussed in §3.2.3. Adapted from Swinbank (2014).
while acting as a test-bed for production-level VTP deploy-
ments and for new technologies and “value-added” services
to assist in addressing the transient deluge. Section 2 pro-
vides an overview of VTP and discusses the general topol-
ogy of event distribution networks. Section 3 describes how
Comet has been designed and built to meet the protocol
specifications. Section 4 describes how Comet builds upon
VTP to help address future challenges in VOEvent filtering
and selection. Section 5 considers the performance impli-
cations of deploying VTP in support of next-generation
astronomical infrastructure, considering both the scalabil-
ity of the protocol to large numbers of events and to high
latency connections. In §6 we consider the security impli-
cations of VOEvents, how they can be addressed at the
transport level, and describe a system being prototyped in
Comet. Implications for future revisions of the VTP stan-
dard are summarized in §7. Section 8 describes the terms
under which Comet is available and how to obtain it, while
a summary of the results are presented and some more
general conclusions drawn for future of VOEvent transport
in §9.
2. VOEvent Transport Protocol
VTP provides a simple system for distributing VO-
Events from one or more authors to a network of poten-
tially interested subscribers. It builds upon the semantics
of VOEvent interchange described in the VOEvent stan-
dard (Seaman et al., 2011), but includes only those entities
which directly interact by means of the network. To wit,
VTP defines the following network roles:
Author An author is responsible for creating and publish-
ing one or more VOEvents.
Subscriber A subscriber receives the VOEvents generated
by one or more authors.
Broker A broker receives VOEvents from other network
entities re-distributes them to one or more subscribers.
In addition, a broker may perform “added value”
services. These could be at the request of particular
subscribers (e.g. to apply a filter to the event stream
sent to that subscriber), or applied more generally to
the event stream (e.g. to apply some annotation to
all events processed).
Connections between these entities take place over TCP
(Cert and Kahn, 1974). The VTP standard defines three
types of connection:
Author to Broker The author makes a TCP connection
to the broker and transmits a VOEvent packet. On
receipt of a syntactically valid message, the broker
sends an acknowledgement. The connection is then
closed; submitting a further VOEvent packet would
require initiating a new connection.
Broker to Subscriber The subscriber opens a TCP con-
nection to the broker, which remains open indefinitely.
The broker and subscriber send periodic “heartbeat”
messages over the connection to verify that it remains
live. When the broker receives an event for distribu-
tion, it sends it to the subscriber over this connection.
The subscriber replies with an acknowledgement.
Broker to Broker A broker may subscribe to the output
of another broker. In doing so, it acts as a subscriber,
and the relationship between them is as described in
“Broker to Subscriber”, above.
Note that the broker-to-subscriber connection remains
open at all times, even when a subscriber has recently
received an event. The standard mandates that the sub-
scriber must always be prepared to receive more events,
even while a previous event is still being processed: other-
wise, a backlog of events waiting to be sent to a particular
subscriber could build up and overload the broker.
By causing brokers to subscribe to the output of their
peers, it is possible to build extended networks of mutually-
interconnected brokers. An author need only publish to
one broker and ultimately their event will be distributed to
all entities on the network. This is not only efficient, it is
also robust: the failure of any given entity can only cause
local disruption to the distribution system. The topology
of such a network, and the path a VOEvent packet might
take across it, is shown in Fig. 1.
In addition to passing VOEvent XML documents, VTP
defines a “Transport” document type. Transport docu-
ments are used for the heartbeat messages between brokers
and subscribers and for sending acknowledgement of event
receipt. The documents are kept intentionally short, pro-
viding simply a timestamp, an indication of the originator,
2
and—in the case of an acknowledgement—the identity of
the event being acknowledged.
VTP makes limited provision for securing access to the
network: that is, for limiting the authors and subscribers
which may connect to a given broker. The simplest, al-
beit least flexible, approach is for the broker to maintain
a “whitelist” of the IP addresses of entities which are au-
thorized to connect, and simply drop connections coming
from elsewhere. Such a system is convenient and easy to
implement for small networks, but can rapidly become un-
wieldy as the list of authorized users grows or as those users
need to connect from multiple addresses. An alternative
is therefore suggested in the standard based on crypto-
graphically signed transport messages, which enable an
entity to securely demonstrate its identity on connection.
The means by which these signatures may be applied is
not specified in the VTP standard, which rather refers to
the systems proposed by Rixon (2005), Denny (2008) and
Allen (2008). The application of cryptographic signatures
to XML documents is a potentially complex topic, and one
to which we return in §6.
3. The Design and implementation of Comet
Comet is a freely available, open source packages which
can fulfil any or all of the roles within a VTP network.
It can receive events from remote brokers (the subscriber
role), receive events from authors and distribute them to
subscribers (the broker role) and it provides a tool which
can publish a VOEvent to a remote broker (the author
role). Comet aims both to act as a production-ready event
distribution system, which projects can immediately start
using to service their science goals, and as a convenient
system for exploring the characteristics of VTP and proto-
typing future extensions to the protocol. The first of these
goals has already been achieved, with Comet instrumental
in low-latency follow up of gamma-ray bursts (Staley et al.,
2013). Early results from the second goal are described in
the subsequent sections of this manuscript.
Version 1.1.0 of Comet was released in February of 2014
and is current stable version at time of writing. Here, we
specifically consider the implementation of this version, al-
though there are currently no plans for major architectural
changes in the future.
3.1. Twisted Python and event-driven programming
Comet is implemented in Python, and is built atop the
Twisted networking engine4. Twisted enables an event-
driven and asynchronous style of development which is
extensively used throughout Comet.
Conventionally, we think of programs as being executed
in order: the system executes the instructions described
by the first statement, followed by the second statement,
4https://twistedmatrix.com/
class VOEventReceiver(Protocol):
TIMEOUT = 20 # seconds
def connectionMade(self):
setTimeout(self.TIMEOUT)
def connectionLost(self):
setTimeout(None)
close_connection()
def timeoutConnection(self):
log.msg("Connection timed out")
close_connection()
def stringReceived(self, data):
try:
message = parse(data)
if is_valid(message):
log.info("Good message received")
acknowledge(message)
process_event(message)
else:
log.warning("Bad message received")
except ParseError:
log.warning("Message unparsable")
finally:
close_connection()
Listing 1: An example of an event-driven Twisted protocol, based on
Comet’s VOEventReceiver.
and so on until the process is complete. Of course, spread-
ing a process across multiple threads of execution makes
the precise ordering of statements non-deterministic (and,
indeed, introduces a whole new level of complexity in the
process; Lee, 2006), but the fundamental point remains:
the aim is to execute the program as rapidly and efficiently
as possible and then exit.
It is obvious that this model does not map well to net-
work based applications. Consider the “subscriber” role
in a VOEvent network: it is not rushing to finish some
particular task and then terminate, but rather it contin-
ues listening to the network indefinitely for the arrival of
VOEvents, and takes appropriate action when an packet is
received. Event-driven programming is the generalization
of this concept: rather than a list of instructions to be
executed sequentially, we define the actions that should be
taken in response to possible events. Twisted provides an
“event loop” which waits for events and calls the appropriate
actions when they occur.
When talking to the network, Twisted provides the
Protocol as an abstraction for managing events. A pro-
tocol defines the interaction that a particular component
of the system has with the network. For example, List-
ing 1 shows a simplified version of the protocol for Comet’s
VOEventReceiver. This is the part of the broker which
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listens to the network for submissions from authors. Four
separate events are handled by this protocol:
• When a new connection is initiated by an author,
the broker sets a timer on the connection. If no
traffic is received, the timer will eventually reach zero
and the connection will be timed-out. The timer is
initialized to the essentially arbitrary value of 20 s;
this may be refined (or made user-configurable) in
light of practical experience in future Comet releases.
• When a connection is lost, the connection is closed
and the timeout is aborted.
• When a connection times out, close it.
• When a string is received over the connection, parse
it and see if it can be recognized as a valid VOEvent.
If so, return an acknowledgement and process the
newly received event (for example by re-distributing
it to subscribers). If not, log a warning message.
Finally, shut down the connection.
Similar, although often more complex, protocols are
defined for all of the other roles in the system: an author
connecting to a broker (VOEventSender), a broker to a
subscriber (VOEventBroadcaster), and an subscriber to a
broker (VOEventSubscriber).
Event-driven programming provides a convenient ab-
straction for responding to network events. However, it
does not address issues regarding concurrency. As described
in §2, VTP requires that even immediately after receiv-
ing an event subscribers must be ready to accept another:
there can be no delay while the event is ingested. Contrast
this with the model described above and outlined in List-
ing 1: here, when an event is received, each of the functions
parse(), is valid(), acknowledge(), process event()
and close connection() is called in turn. If these opera-
tions are not assumed to be instantaneous, we must wait
for them to complete before proceeding. While waiting,
new events cannot be received. We are thus in violation of
the VTP standard5.
Twisted addresses this problem through the use of De-
ferreds. A deferred is effectively a promise that processing
is underway and that results will be available in future.
We can then queue up other processing tasks (or “call-
backs”) that will be executed when the result of the de-
ferred is available. For example, we could define a version
of parse()—call it deferred parse()—that, rather than
returning an object representing a parsed version of the
VOEvent document, returns a promise to eventually parse
the document in the future and then make it available
5In practice, the implementation of some of these operations used
in the Comet codebase can be assumed to be effectively instantaneous.
This is safe so long as the time taken to parse is sufficiently short
that no backlog of events waiting to be processed builds up and no
network timeouts occur.
for further processing. We can then queue up our other
functions to run only when parsing is complete. For ex-
ample, see Listing 2, in which we queue up a number of
callbacks to be run when parsing is complete and also add
an “errback” which handles logging a message if any of the
callbacks fail to run successfully.
def stringReceived(self, data):
d = deferred_parse(data)
d.addCallback(is_valid)
d.addCallback(check_role)
d.addCallback(acknowledge)
d.addCallback(process_event)
d.addErrback(log_failure)
d.addCallback(close_connection)
Listing 2: A version of VOEventReceiver.stringReceived() (shown
in Listing 1) based on deferred processing.
Finally, we must implement deferred parse(). Sim-
ply returning a deferred from a function does not prevent it
from blocking. Instead, we create a dedicated thread which
is devoted to parsing the data, and have it run concur-
rently with the rest of the application. When that thread
completes, the deferred fires with its result. Conveniently,
Twisted makes it easy to apply this pattern to a blocking
function such as our parse(): see Listing 3.
from twisted.internet.threads import \
deferToThread
def deferred_parse(data):
return deferToThread(parse, data)
Listing 3: The implementation of the non-blocking deferred parse()
function.
Although the examples presented in this section are only
intended to be illustrative, they demonstrate the concepts
of asynchronous, event-driven programming upon which
Comet is built and are fundamental to understanding its
operation.
It is worth emphasizing that the techniques described in
this section are not unique to Twisted. Other frameworks
such as gevent6 and asyncio7 provide implementations of
similar capabilities in Python, and equivalent libraries are
available for many other languages. However, the rich
software ecosystem supported by Twisted, combined with
its demonstrated ability to deliver acceptable performance
(§5), have provided an excellent platform upon which to
develop Comet.
6http://www.gevent.org/
7Recently added to the Python standard library; https://docs.
python.org/3.4/library/asyncio.html
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3.2. Comet architecture
Comet is built around the four Twisted protocols dis-
cussed in §3.1. These enable it to take the part of either
side in each of the three connection types discussion in §2.
For the convenience of end users, these are made accessible
under two distinct front ends. In this section, we first
introduce those components and describe the relationship
between them, and then discuss how Comet implements
some specific requirements of VTP.
3.2.1. The components of Comet
The authorial component is comet-sendvo. This is a
command-line tool which enables the user to submit a
VOEvent to a remote broker. The user is expected to
supply the VOEvent either on standard input or via a
reference to the filesystem; comet-sendvo transmits it to
the specified destination using the VOEventSender protocol
and shuts down.
Processing a single event and then exiting is an ap-
propriate model for an author, but is not the behaviour
required of a broker or subscriber. Rather, these tools must
remain active, continuing to receive and process VOEvents
until the user shuts them down. To support this mode of
operation, Comet can run as a “daemon”, or background
process. The Comet daemon can:
1. Accept submissions from authors (including, of course,
comet-sendvo);
2. Subscribe to event streams from one or more remote
brokers;
3. Distribute event packets received (whether by direct
author submission or by subscription) to its own
subscribers;
4. Execute arbitrary logic based upon the event packets
received.
A single Comet daemon is capable of performing any
or all of these actions, depending upon configuration: it is
not necessary to start separate “broker” and “subscriber”
daemons, for example.
Both comet-sendvo and the Comet daemon make ex-
tensive use of the facilities provided by Twisted for event-
driven and asynchronous programming, as well as its sup-
port for logging and daemonization. They are exclusively
command-line driven, and do not rely on configuration
files.
3.2.2. Schema validation
It is possible to construct XML documents which claim
to be VOEvents but which do not, in fact, adhere to the
VOEvent XML schema. In some cases, the document may
be completely unparsable; in others, it may be possible to
extract some data, but with unpredictable results and no
guarantee that the recipient receives the information the
author intended.
Current versions of Comet insists that events being
submitted to the broker by an author comply with the
VOEvent 2.0 schema8; extending this to include later ver-
sions as they become available is straightforward. Schema
validation is applied to the event before it is accepted for
redistribution by the broker; if that validation fails, a nak
message which indicates the problem is sent to the au-
thor and the event is dropped. It is to be hoped that a
well-intentioned author will correct and resubmit the event.
When receiving events from an upstream broker (either
as a broker itself or as a subscriber) Comet does not attempt
to validate the event against the schema (although it is still
required that the event must be parsable). This is because
there is no way to indicate the failure to the author: any
nak sent to the upstream broker will not be propagated
further. The author cannot know that their event has
been rejected, will not correct and re-send, and valuable
scientific content may be lost.
3.2.3. Event de-duplication
As described in §2 it is possible to build a mutually
interconnected “mesh” of brokers to efficiently and reli-
ably distribute VOEvent packets to a large number of
subscribers. However, this runs the risk that events could
continue “looping” on the network indefinitely, as two or
more brokers which subscribe to each other’s feeds repeat-
edly exchange the same event. To avoid this problem,
Comet refuses to process any given event more than once:
if a newly received event is the same as one which has been
previously seen, it is simply dropped without being further
distributed.
In order for this approach to be effective, it is necessary
to define what it means for two VOEvent documents to be
“the same”. In particular, due to the nature of XML, it is
possible for exactly the same information about an event
(the “infoset”) to be encoded in multiple different, but all
equally valid, XML documents. At the simplest level, this
is because XML is (for the most part) white space agnostic—
new lines or spaces can be inserted without changing the
meaning of the document. The question becomes more
complex, though, when we consider the various versions
of the VOEvent standard. Version 2.0 (Seaman et al.,
2011) is current, but the previous version (1.1; Seaman
et al., 2006) is still in use by some systems. If the same
information about the same astronomical event is encoded
in a VOEvent 2.0 document and a VOEvent 1.11 document,
are these “the same”?
This question is particularly pertinent because this
situation is exactly that which exists in practice: since
20129, NASA GCN has issued both version 1.1 and version
2.0 VOEvents containing the same information.
Seaman et al. (2011) requires that each VOEvent carry
an IVORN10 which “will stand in for a particular packet”.
It is this IVORN that is used to identify events in the
8http://www.ivoa.net/xml/VOEvent/VOEvent-v2.0.xsd
9http://gcn.gsfc.nasa.gov/admin/voevent_version20_
available.txt
10International Virtual Observatory Resource Name
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context of references and citations, for example. There
has been some debate11 as to whether IVORNs uniquely
identify a particular infoset or a particular representation
thereof: this is not currently well defined by the relevant
documentation. In the case of the events issued by GCN, a
single IVORN is used to describe both the version 1.1 and
the version 2.0 VOEvent packets: this provide a de facto
standard that the IVORN identifies the infoset.
VTP makes no distinction between the versions of VO-
Events which it transmits: the same protocol may be used
for version 1.1, or 2.0, or putative future versions. However,
the consumer of a particular VOEvent may well have a
toolchain that is tuned to work with one particular stan-
dard. In other words, authors may wish to use a VOEvent
network to distribute multiple different versions of the same
event, while subscribers may depend on receiving a specific
representation of that event. If an author submits version
1.1 and version 2.0 representations of an event, it would not
be appropriate for a broker to regard them as duplicates
and discard one of them. The only possible conclusion
is that the IVORN is not a suitable means of identifying
unique packets for the purposes of de-duplication.
Comet therefore regards packets as duplicates only if
they are bit-for-bit identical with an packet which has been
seen before. This is determined by calculating the SHA-1
(Eastlake and Jones, 2001) cryptographic hash of every
packet which is seen by a Comet daemon and storing it,
together with the time and date at which the packet was
seen, in a DBM-style (AT&T, 1979) persistent database12.
When an event is received, its SHA-1 hash is calculated and
compared against the contents of the database to establish
if it has been seen before.
Each individual SHA-1 hash is stored as 40 bytes, plus a
further 13 bytes are used to records the timestamp. The to-
tal storage requirement is therefore very modest. However,
on a busy broker processing many events, the database
could grow to a significant size, wasting resources and slow-
ing down access. Therefore, Comet periodically removes
all events older than 30 days from its database. Duplicates
issued more than 30 days after the original event will there-
fore not be detected; however, an event loop with such a
long period poses no threat to the integrity of the network.
It may be appropriate to tune this timescale in future based
on practical experience with large scale VTP deployments.
It should be noted that this de-duplication scheme
requires that all entities on the network forward events
unchanged: even an apparently inconsequential change to
an event packet which results in a valid encoding the same
infoset as before would result in a different SHA-1 hash
for the event. The current VTP standard implies but does
11http://www.ivoa.net/pipermail/voevent/2012-March/002836.
html
12“DBM-style” databases provide mappings between “keys” and
“values” in the manner of an associative array. Various libraries
implementing this style of database exist; Comet uses Python’s anydbm
interface, which automatically chooses a particular implementation
based upon the platform on which it is running.
not absolutely require this behaviour: see §7 for further
discussion.
3.2.4. Security and whitelisting
The released version of Comet described here (1.1.0;
§3) does not implement an authentication scheme based
on cryptographic signatures as described in §2. Work is
ongoing on prototyping such a scheme using Comet as a
test-bed: this is described in §6.
When acting as a broker, Comet includes the ability to
check authors submitting events against a whitelist of IP
addresses. Multiple disjoint ranges of addresses to whitelist
may be specified using CIDR notation (Fuller et al., 1993),
making the system very flexible.
Comet does not currently provide built-in whitelisting
support for subscribers. However, equivalent functionality
is available though the use of an operating system level
packet filter.
3.2.5. Acting on events received
Just receiving a VOEvent and optionally re-distributing
it is of limited practical value: ultimately, some recipient
of the event will wish to take action based upon it. The
algorithms which may be employed to determine whether
a given event is worth of follow-up are dependent on the
particular science goals of the recipient, are potentially com-
plex, and are certainly outside the scope of this manuscript.
Since it is not possible to anticipate the requirements of
the end user in a universally applicable way, Comet rather
seeks to be easily adapted to each particular use case. Two
mechanisms are provided to make this possible.
The simplest option is that when a new event is received,
Comet can spawn an external process and provide the text
of the event packet to it on standard input. The process is
run asynchronously, so that potentially lengthy processing
jobs can be run on events without interrupting Comet’s
regular operation. Comet monitors the execution of the
process and logs a warning if it is unsuccessful (that is, if
it exits with a status other than 0), but otherwise has no
control over the processing performed.
In some circumstances, the user may wish for more
control than is provided for by passing events to another
process. Comet therefore makes it possible to write plugins,
which can be loaded into the daemon at run time. Users
write plugins in Python, implementing a standard interface.
Plugins provide a call () method which is invoked
with the contents of an event whenever one is received. An
example is shown in Listing 4.
Comet automatically probes for all available plugins
and makes them available as command line arguments, so
the user can specify which plugins are required when the
daemon is started. If required, plugins may also define
configuration parameters implementing the IHasOptions
interface; these are exposed as command line options.
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from zope.interface import implementer
from twisted.plugin import IPlugin
from comet.icomet import IHandler, IHasOptions
# A plugin implements the IPlugin
# and IHandler interfaces
@implementer(IPlugin, IHandler)
class ExamplePlugin(object):
# The "name" attribute is used to refer
# to the plugin on the command line.
name = "example"
# The "__call__()" method is invoked
# when a new event is received.
def __call__(self, event):
print "Event received"
# The plugin must be instantiated before use.
example_plugin = ExamplePlugin()
Listing 4: A simple example of a Comet event handling plugin. This
plugin prints a message whenever a new event is received.
4. Filtering events
Next-generation telescopes such as LSST anticipate to
detecting and announcing transients using VOEvent at
rates of perhaps tens of millions of events per day (Kantor,
2014). It is unlikely that most individual subscribers will
have a use for all of these events. Winnowing that event
stream down so that each subscriber receives only those
events which are of direct relevance to them is both efficient
in terms of resource usage, as fewer events need to be
transported to and processed by the subscriber, but also
enables subscribers to deploy simple, well-targeted systems
that address their science goals, rather than attempting
to devise efficient ways to process millions of VOEvent
packets.
Efforts to develop intelligent systems for alerting users
only of those events which are of relevance to them are
ongoing, and will continue into the future (Williams et al.,
2009). Comet contributes to this effort by introducing a
powerful XPath (Clark and DeRose, 1999) based filtering
system.
4.1. XPath queries
XPath is a language for selecting parts of and computing
values over an XML document. XPath expressions may
return one of four different result types:
• A Boolean value;
• A floating point number;
• A textual string;
• A set of XML “nodes”, representing parts of the
document.
XPath enables users to specify complex queries, includ-
ing testing the values of arbitrary elements or attributes
specified in the document and combining those tests with
Boolean logic. A complete reference is outside the scope of
this manuscript, but some examples may serve to illustrate
the possibilities.
Starting with string matching,
//Who/Author[shortName="VO-GCN"]
XPath expression 1
returns a set of all nodes in the document which list the
author’s “short name” as VO-GCN. More complex matches
can use functions, such as
//How[contains(Description, "Swift")]
XPath expression 2
which returns the set of all nodes which mention “Swift”
in the context of a describing how the data was obtained.
Numerical comparisons are also possible:
//Param[@name="Sun_Distance" and @value>40]
XPath expression 3
provides the set of all parameters called Sun Distance
with a numerical value greater than 40.
These expression can be combined, so that for example
//How[contains(Description, "Swift")] or
( //Param[@name="Sun_Distance" and @value>40]
and //Who/Author[shortName="VO-GCN"]) )
XPath expression 4
returns a Boolean value which is true if the event either
mentions “Swift” or both has a Sun Distance parame-
ter greater than 40 and originates from GCN, and false
otherwise.
4.2. Integration with Comet
Comet makes it possible for a subscriber to supply one
or more XPath expressions to a broker. When the broker
receives an event, it evaluates each expression over the
event, and only forward it to the subscriber if at least one
of the expressions evaluates produces a positive result.
Comet takes the result returned by XPath and applies
Python’s bool() built-in function to determine if the result
is “positive”. For example, the values True, 1 and "string"
(the Boolean true value, a non-zero number and a non-
empty string) as well as a non-empty node set are all
positive, while False, 0 and "" (Boolean false, the number 0
and an empty string) and the empty node set are “negative”
results.
VTP provides no standardized method for a subscriber
to send their filter preferences to the broker. Comet works
around this by overloading the Transport message system
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provided by VTP and described in §2. According to the
VTP specification, it is legal for a subscriber to send a
Transport message of class authenticationresponse and
with arbitrary metadata embedded at any time during a
VTP session. Comet looks for XPath expressions encoded
in this metadata and installs them as filters for the sub-
scriber; other brokers which comply with the protocol but
do not support this form of filtering should simply ignore
the message.
4.3. Alternative filtering systems
XPath provides a convenient, standardized and expres-
sive language for accessing and performing simple calcula-
tions and comparisons based upon the contents of XML
documents. Incorporating XPath based filtering into Comet
was straightforward and doing so provides a powerful means
of winnowing high-volume VOEvent streams.
However, XPath is not appropriate for meeting every
possible use case. In particular, XPath expressions are
evaluated over individual VOEvents, with no reference to
their surrounding context. Consequently, XPath expres-
sions cannot be used to draw scientific conclusions—or even
perform rate-limiting—based on the evolving contents of
a stream of events. Further, XPath provides no specialist
astronomical or mathematical routines: it is impractical
to use it for filtering based on operations beyond simple
arithmetic and comparisons.
Given these considerations, it is likely that addressing
some scientific goals will require a different approach to
filtering than that currently supported by Comet. The VTP
system explicitly allows for this by encouraging brokers
to layer arbitrary “added value” services on top of the
basic VTP system: a richer, more astronomically-focused
and context-aware filtering system is an example of the
possibilities. Indeed, such a service has precedent in the
form of SkyAlert (Williams et al., 2009), which provides a
Python-based interface to filtering events.
5. Performance
Comet not been designed primarily for performance:
at time of writing, typical VOEvent brokers are process-
ing perhaps a few hundred events per day, so the total
computational and storage demands are extremely modest.
However, it is informative to consider both how Comet
and the VTP architecture scale to cope with the millions
of events per night promised by future facilities such as
LSST. In this section, we quantify both the number of
events Comet is capable of processing, the latency which
it introduces to the event stream, and the number of sub-
scribers which a broker can conveniently service. We begin
by describing the test system, move on to discuss the perfor-
mance characteristics of the major operations which Comet
performs when processing an individual VOEvent message,
and then take a more holistic approach to consider the
performance of a networked Comet broker under a variety
of loads.
5.1. Test system configuration
The basic configuration of all tests below consists of
one or more authors connecting to a broker and sending
it events which the broker then distributes to one or more
subscribers. The processes acting as authors, brokers and
subscribers were all run on the same modest desktop system,
based on an Intel Core i7 940 CPU13 and 8 GiB RAM.
Storage was provided by two 7200 RPM magnetic disks
configured as a RAID-0 array. The system was running
Debian14 GNU/Linux with kernel version 3.13.
In realistic scenarios, VOEvent authors, brokers and
subscribers would not co-exist on the same system. How-
ever, providing many separate test systems was impractical,
and exchanging events over the public internet (or even over
a local network) introduces an extra layer of uncertainty
in terms of network latency. Instead, the various processes
being tested were run in isolated process containers using
Docker15. Docker-based containers operate in much the
same way as traditional virtual machines, except that they
incur no virtualization overhead. They directly address the
same kernel as the host system, but are only able to com-
municate with each other over (virtual) network interfaces.
Within each container a minimal Ubuntu16 Linux 12.04
system was installed, providing Python 2.7.3 and Twisted
11.1.0. All testing was carried out with Comet 1.1.0. The
“Dockerfile” used to create exactly the system used for these
tests, as well as all the benchmarking scripts and plugins
described below, are available from the Comet repository
(§8).
5.2. Individual event processing
When an event is received from an author by the Comet
broker for redistribution to subscribers it passes through
five distinct processing stages. These are:
1. The XML document text is parsed into an internal
data structure;
2. The VOEvent is checked for validity against the VO-
Event 2.0 XML schema (§3.2.2);
3. The SHA-1 hash of the document text is calculated;
4. The hash is compared against, and, if necessary, ap-
pended to the database of previously seen VOEvents
(§3.2.3);
5. Optionally, one or more XPath expressions are evalu-
ated against the document before it is forwarded to
each subscriber (§4).
Most of these operations are likely to depend upon the
particular VOEvent document being handled: a longer and
more complex message will naturally require more effort to
process (the exception is checking and recording the docu-
ment against the event database, which involves processing
13Four cores with two threads each running at 2.93 GHz.
14http://www.debian.org/
15https://www.docker.io/
16http://www.ubuntu.com/
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just the IVORN rather than the complete document). To
best represent a real-world workload, the tests were car-
ried out using a corpus of 16425 VOEvents harvested from
currently operation VTP brokers between 5 and 15 July
201417. The VOEvents originated from a variety of sources,
and include both notifications of astronomical phenomena
and sundry utility and test messages. The longest docu-
ment consisted of 9647 bytes; the shortest 636; the median
length was 5002 bytes.
Sections 5.2.1–5.2.5, below, describe tests carried out
to investigate the performance of each of these operations
in turn. A summary of the results is presented in §5.2.6.
5.2.1. XML parsing
All 16425 VOEvent documents in the test corpus were
read from disk and stored as textual data in memory. Each
in turn was parsed into Comet’s internal VOEvent repre-
sentation18. In order to confirm that parsing was successful,
the Comet API was used to retrieve the version attribute
from the parsed document and confirm that it was equal to
"2.0". The total time taken to parse and read the attribute
from all of the events was measured.
5.2.2. Schema validation
All test VOEvent documents were read from disk, parsed,
and stored in memory using Comet’s internal representa-
tion. The VOEvent 2.0 XML schema was also read from
disk and parsed into an lxml XMLSchema object, the same
data structure as used by Comet for schema validation
during normal operations. The total time taken to check
all the events against the schema was measured. Two of
the events failed validation.
5.2.3. SHA-1 calculation
All VOEvent documents in the test corpus were read
from disk, parsed, and stored in memory using Comet’s
internal representation. The total time taken to calculate
the 40 byte hexadecimal SHA-1 hash for each event in turn
was measured.
5.2.4. Event database operations
The contents of a particular VOEvent document are
not relevant when working with the event database: the
database operations only involve manipulating the arrival
time of the VOEvent and it’s SHA-1 hash. For this test,
therefore, we do not make use of the corpus of events
described above. Instead, a series of test VOEvent packets
of the form shown in Listing 5 was generated. Each packet
was compliant with the VOEvent 2.0 schema, but carried
17All documents claiming to comply with the VOEvent 2.0
schema which were distributed by any of voevent.phys.soton.ac.uk,
voevent.dc3.com, voevent.swinbank.org, 68.169.57.253, 209.208.
78.170 or 50.116.49.68 were collected. The three numerical IPv4
addresses are used by NASA GCN and do not have DNS PTR records.
18Comet represents XML documents using a custom-built wrapper
around the Element class provided by lxml (http://lxml.de/).
a relatively small payload amounting to little more than a
timestamp reflecting when the event was created.
A batch of 10000 such test messages was generated and
stored in memory. The total time taken to both verify
that each VOEvent was not initially present in the event
database and then record it in the event database was
recorded19. Comet does not provide an interface to the
event database which does not involve calculating a SHA-1
hash; the time measured therefore includes hash calculation
for each event.
The experiment described was initially performed with
the event database stored on magnetic disk. The mean
time taken to check and record an event in the database
is shown in Tab. 1. Note that this is orders of magni-
tude above the times measured for the other processing
steps. This is, perhaps, unsurprising: accessing disk storage
involves significant overhead. To mitigate this, memory-
based filesystem was created based on tmpfs (Kerrisk et al.,
2014) and both broker and subscriber were configured to
store their event databases here. This storage is entirely
RAM-based, so avoids the extra delays in writing to disk.
The experiment was repeated with the database stored
on the tmpfs filesystem; the result was a factor of 25
improvement in the time taken to process each event, as
shown in Tab. 1.
As per §3.2.3, Comet stores hashes of the VOEvents
received for 30 days. On a busy VOEvent network, this
could involve generating a much larger database than the
10000 events tested, which may impact performance. The
previous experiment was therefore repeated 1000 times
using the same databases stored on tmpfs, resulting in a
database containing 107 hashes in total. The lowest mean
processing time per event was measured when processing
batch 155, at an average of 0.000491 s per event; the highest
when processing batch 855, at an average of 0.000502 s per
event. There was no systematic increase in processing time
with event database size. Testing with a significantly larger
database was impossible due to the available memory.
5.2.5. XPath evaluation
The time taken to evaluate an XPath expression over a
VOEvent document depends not only on the complexity
of the document being processed but also on the XPath
expression itself. A detailed discussion of the performance
characteristics of XPath is outside the scope of this work;
instead, we take the example queries given in §4.1 as repre-
sentative of a typical workload.
All test VOEvent documents were read from disk, parsed,
and stored in memory using Comet’s internal representa-
tion. Each of of the XPath expressions in turn was parsed
into an lxml XPath object, as used by Comet for XPath
filtering during normal operations. The total time taken
19In version 1.1.0 of Comet, as tested, checking and recording
an event are distinct operations. Later versions combine these to
form an atomic check-and-record operation, which is both improves
performance and avoids a race condition.
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<?xml version=’1.0’ encoding=’UTF-8’?>
<voe:VOEvent
xmlns:voe="http://www.ivoa.net/xml/VOEvent/v2.0"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
ivorn="ivo://comet.broker/test#TestEvent-2014-03-31T16:16:37" role="test" version="2.0"
xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.ivoa.net/xml/VOEvent/v2.0
http://www.ivoa.net/xml/VOEvent/VOEvent-v2.0.xsd"
>
<Who>
<AuthorIVORN>ivo://comet.broker/test</AuthorIVORN>
<Date>2014-03-31T16:16:37.040340</Date>
</Who>
<What>
<Description>Broker test event generated by Comet 1.1.0.</Description>
<Reference uri="http://comet.transientskp.org/"/>
</What>
</voe:VOEvent>
Listing 5: An example of the form of VOEvent used for benchmark testing. The ivorn attribute of the VOEvent element and the Date element
were automatically generated and reflect the time at which the packet was created.
Table 1: Timing results for each stage of Comet’s processing of
a VOEvent document. All results except the check against the
event database were based on a corpus of 16425 genuine VOEvent
documents; the check against the event database was performed using
synthetic test data. Each test is described in §5.2.
Operation Total (s) Per event (s)
XML parsing 1.625465 0.000099
SHA-1 calculation 0.152024 0.000009
Event database operations:a
Magnetic disk - 0.013331
tmpfs - 0.000499
Schema validation 1.385420 0.000084
XPath evaluation:b
Expression 1 0.218424 0.000013
Expression 2 0.221899 0.000014
Expression 3 0.579474 0.000035
Expression 4 0.283376 0.000017
aAlso includes SHA-1 calculation.
bExpressions as defined in §4.1.
to check all events against each expression in turn was
measured.
5.2.6. Results
The total time for operating on all messages being
tested (where applicable), as well as the mean time per
event, for each of the tests above is recorded in Table 1.
Note that the results recorded for XPath filtering are not
directly comparable to those for the other tests described.
All the other operations are performed once per event
received by the broker. In contrast, potentially several
different XPath expressions are evaluated per subscriber for
every event received. Thus, even though the time recorded
for evaluating the XPath expressions is substantially less
than that recorded for event parsing or schema validation,
the total time spent on XPath processing may, in fact, be
greater in a deployed system.
Leaving aside XPath, of the individual operations per-
formed once per event interacting with the event database
dominates: even when using a tmpfs-backed database the
time taken to check and record the event hash is more than
twice that spent on the other operations combined, and is
compounded by a further factor of over 25 when magnetic
disks are used. Future performance-focused development
of Comet should investigate ways to mitigate this issue.
5.3. Latency
For certain science cases, maximizing the scientific rel-
evance of follow-up observations requires extremely rapid
response. For example, identifying precursors of fast radio
bursts (Thornton et al., 2013) would require action on a
timescale a tens of milliseconds. It is therefore important
that the VOEvent transport system does not introduce ex-
cessive latency to the dissemination of event notifications.
For the purposes of this discussion, we define the “la-
tency” of a VOEvent as the time elapsed between its cre-
ation by an author and the instant at which it has been
received by a subscriber and that subscriber is in a position
to take action (using the strategies described in §3.2.5)
based upon it.
In this test, we measure the latency introduced by
passing a VOEvent from an author through a Comet broker
and on to a Comet-based subscriber.
5.3.1. Test setup
A script was used to generate 3000 individual VOEvent
packets of the form shown in Listing 5 and submit them
to a broker at intervals of 0.3 seconds.
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Figure 2: Fraction of events received at a given latency (time between
generation by the author and processing by the subscriber, as de-
scribed in §5.3). The uppermost plot reflects the default configuration;
the central plot uses Twisted’s epoll() based reactor; the bottom
plot uses epoll() and stores the event database in memory.
A plugin (§3.2.5) was written which, whenever an event
of the form described above is received, compares the times-
tamp in the event with the current time, and saves the
difference to a log file. This plugin was enabled on a sub-
scriber, which was then connected to the broker.
Both the benchmarking script and the plugin described
are available from the Comet repository (§8).
5.3.2. Results
The distribution of latencies among the received events
when this test was run in the default configuration is shown
in the top panel of Fig. 2. The mean latency was 0.022 s
with a standard deviation of 0.011 s; the longest recorded
latency for any event was 0.171 s.
As described in §3.1, Twisted provides an event-driven
framework. The core of this framework is the “reactor”,
which provides a uniform interface to event handling across
the platforms upon which Twisted can run. The internal
implementation of the reactor itself can vary from plat-
form to platform to most efficiently take advantage of the
facilities available to it.
The default reactor implementation used by Twisted on
the system used for testing is based on the poll() system
call (IEEE and The Open Group, 2013). However, modern
Linux systems provide the alternative epoll() call (Kerrisk
et al., 2014) which provides a more efficient alternative.
Twisted provides a reactor which is based upon epoll().
The same experiment was therefore repeated, but with both
broker and subscriber based on this alternative reactor.
The results are shown in the central panel of Fig. 2. This
provided a somewhat improved mean latency of 0.019 s with
a standard deviation of 0.011 s, and a reduced maximum
latency of 0.130 s.
Section 5.2.4 established that the event database op-
erations take an average of 0.013 s when the database is
stored on magnetic disk, as it was in this default configura-
tion: this is some 70 % of the measured event latency. The
same section demonstrated a 25-fold improvement when
the database was stored in RAM using the tmpfs filesystem.
This performance improvement comes at some cost: RAM
technologies typically used in modern systems are inher-
ently volatile, and the event database would not survive if
the system were powered down or rebooted. Further, the
107 event database described in §5.2.4 consumed around
1 GiB of storage; given a database retention period of 30
days (§3.2.3) and potentially multi-million-per-day event
rates from next generation facilities, memory capacity may
be a limiting factor.
These considerations notwithstanding, the database was
re-created on a tmpfs filesystem and the test repeated. The
results are shown in the bottom panel of Fig. 2. Not only
are these latencies lower (mean 0.0063 s, maximum 0.013 s)
than those based on magnetic disks, but they are also much
more consistent than the previous tests (standard deviation
0.00033 s).
An overhead of no more than around ten milliseconds is
comparable to that which might be expected from network
delays over short links, and is unlikely to be of significance
in all but the most demanding of astronomical applications.
Note, however, that this figure was measured on an other-
wise unloaded system: while it sets a lower bound on the
latency added by Comet, a production system under load
is unlikely to perform at the same level.
For the rest of the tests presented in this manuscript,
we continue to adopt the epoll() and tmpfs configuration
described here.
5.4. Number of subscribers
In order to meaningfully act as a distribution, rather
than simply a forwarding, system, and certainly in order to
enable the construction of extended networks of intercon-
nected brokers, it is necessary that a single Comet broker
be able to serve many subscribers simultaneously. Here,
we measure how latency increases as more subscribers are
connected to the the broker.
5.4.1. Test setup
Using the same script as described in §5.3.1, 1000 test
events were submitted to a broker. The number of clients
connected to that broker was increased at logarithmic
intervals (1, 2, 4, ...). Each client recorded the latency
of each event received to a log file.
Each Comet process takes approximately 32 MB of mem-
ory, used to hold the Comet code itself, the associated
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Figure 3: Scaling of event latency as a function of subscriber count.
The solid line shows the mean latency divided by the number of
subscribers; the dashed lines are similar, but for the maximum and
minimum latencies recorded.
libraries, the Python interpreter, and the overhead associ-
ated with the Docker container. The test system contained
8 GB RAM. When testing with 256 subscribers, the ma-
chine ran out of memory and started to swap to disk. This
set an upper bound on the number of subscribers which
could be tested.
5.4.2. Results
The latency increases gradually with increasing sub-
scriber count, from a mean of 0.0063 s for a single sub-
scriber to 0.0931 s for 256 subscribers, the highest number
tested: even at this level, the mean latency was less than
0.1 s. The maximum latency rose to a peak of 0.49 s. A
latency of around 0.1 s is comparable to a long range (e.g.
transatlantic) network round trip times and is at a level
where it may start to impact on time-critical astronomical
applications.
The scaling of latency with subscriber count is shown in
Fig. 3. Note that the scaling is better than linear across the
range of subscriber counts tested: ingestion of new events
into the broker, rather than distribution to subscribers,
dominates.
Other than a slowly increasing latency, the Comet sys-
tem showed no ill effects of handling a large number of
subscribers: neither memory nor CPU usage of the broker
showed excessive growth. If the latency were acceptable
for the science application, there would be no difficulty in
serving 256 subscribers in a production mode using this
hardware.
For servicing extremely large numbers of clients while
minimizing latency, a tree-like structure could be estab-
lished. For example, serving 8 subscribers introduced a
mean latency of 0.0093 s. If each of those 8 subscribers
redistributed the event to a further 8 clients, we might
expect a total latency on the order of 0.02 s to reach 256
clients; if the tree were extended to ten levels we might
expect to reach 810 (∼ 109) subscribers with 0.1 s latency.
5.5. Total throughput
Next-generation facilities will announce transients at
rates far outstripping those seen at present. Notably, LSST
is predicted to reach an average rate of 107 events per
night: assuming those events are evenly spaced over a
12 hour period, this is equivalent to over 230 events per
second. This is the output from just a single instrument,
albeit a prolific one, and takes no account of the cascade of
follow-up packets that a significant transient would likely
generate. Here, we measure how the event rate processed
by the Comet broker running on the test system.
5.5.1. Test setup
A script was used to generate 10000 individual VOEvent
messages, which were stored in RAM. After all of the
events had been generated, the author started submitting
them to a Comet broker which had a single subscriber
attached. The total time taken by the author from the
start of the submission of the first event to the closing of
the connection after the submission of the last event was
measured by recording its running time. The total time
from the receipt of the first event to the receipt of the
last event by the subscriber was measured by taking the
difference between the latest and the earliest timestamps
recorded in the event database (§3.2.3). These times are
then converted into an per-second event rate.
The number of concurrent connections between the
author and the broker was varied logarithmically. For each
number of connections, the experiment was repeated 10
times.
5.5.2. Results
Figure 4 shows the how the event rate measured at
both author and subscriber varies with the number of con-
current connections. With a single connection a rate of
283.7 events/second at the author and 283.8 events/second
at the subscriber is achieved. This increases to a peak of
519.2 events/second at the author and 534.2 events/second
at the subscriber with 64 concurrent connections; after
this, increasing he number of connections causes the over-
all throughput to drop. The standard deviation of the
measured rate is also plotted: the throughput is relatively
stable at low connection counts, but substantial variations
are seen with 256 and 512 concurrent connections.
At the highest connection counts, the rate is not only
seen to drop substantially, but also some events are lost in
transit: at the end of the test, the subscriber had received
fewer than 10000 VOEvent packets. Since the throughput
was lower at these rates, and since reliable transmission is
essential, concurrency levels higher than 512 connections
were not investigated.
These results may be explained by considering the bal-
ance between the per-connection overhead and the compute
load on the broker. Since each event is delivered by making
a new connection to the broker (as per the protocol de-
scribed in §2) there is a per-event overhead due to creating
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Figure 4: At top, the mean throughput of events as transmitted by
the author and as received by the subscriber as a function of number
of concurrent connections from author to broker. The central panel
shows the standard deviation of the measured rates. The number
of events which were not successfully received by the subscriber is
shown at the bottom.
and tearing down the connection (§5.6 discusses some of
the overheads in managing TCP connections). At low con-
nection counts, this latency dominates; as the concurrency
increases, the throughput is dominated by the broker load.
At the highest connection counts, the configuration
of the Linux kernel’s networking stack comes in to play.
Large numbers of short lived connections are a relatively
uncommon phenomenon, and the standard configuration
of the Linux kernel is not optimized to handle them effi-
ciently. Indeed, at very high connection counts, the kernel
logged warnings that it was was under a “syn flood” attack
(Computer Emergency Response Team, 1996). Under this
load, connections may be dropped or rejected by the kernel,
leading to events never reaching their destination, as seen
in the lowest panel of Fig. 4. Many options within the
kernel may be tuned to improve its performance under
these network loads. However, since the peak throughput
was already limited by Comet’s CPU requirements at lower
connection counts, they were not investigated here.
It is worth noting that, at low connection counts, the
throughput from author to broker and from broker to
subscriber were effectively identical, but they began to
diverge as the concurrency increased. This is again due
to the per-connection overhead: since the connection from
the broker to the subscriber is permanently kept open, it
is significantly more efficient, and provides a continuously-
available high bandwidth connection. At high connection
counts, the latency involved in servicing many connections
means that such high bandwidth cannot be achieved here
when submitting events.
Without special tuning, a throughput of over 500 events
per second is more than twice that required to service the
average event rate predicted from LSST. Further, this
test was limited by CPU performance on desktop-class
hardware that will be substantially more than a decade
old before LSST is commissioned. In these terms, then,
servicing an LSST-scale event stream with a VTP based
broker seems plausible, although there are a number of
caveats:
• This calculation takes no account of follow-up traffic
generated in response to the events;
• These events did not carry a scientific payload, and
hence are likely to be significantly smaller than those
which might be transmitted in practice;
• Although the mean event rate from LSST will be
around 250 events/second, this will be transmitted
in short bursts of much higher rates. Averaging the
event traffic over time reduces the instantaneous traf-
fic to a manageable level, but introduces significant
additional latencies.
5.6. High-latency connections
Astronomical observatories are frequently located in
remote locations: in deserts, on mountain tops, and so
on. The geographic isolation of these facilities often results
in their having poor internet connections. Even if high-
bandwidth networking is arranged specifically to service
the observatory, network latencies are likely to be high.
One might imagine that some preliminary data analysis
for such an observatory would be performed on-site, rather
than attempting to ship large volumes of raw data out of
a remote location. Further, it would not be practical for
large numbers of external clients to connect inwards to a
VTP broker running at the observatory. Therefore, for the
purposes of this discussion, we we assume that the events
are generated by a VOEvent author on site, then shipped
using VTP to a remote broker for public distribution.
Assuming 10 million alerts are issued by the observatory
per night and each event has a size of around 10 kiB, a
total of 100 GiB of event data might be created. Given that
long range multi-gigabit per second connections are widely
available, the total amount of data to be transmitted is
unlikely to be intractable.
Network latency, however, presents a further problem.
As described in §2, each event must be submitted by the
author initiating a new connection to the broker, submit-
ting the event, waiting for an acknowledgement, and then
closing the connection. Sending the event and waiting
for acknowledgement involves a network round-trip. How-
ever, data is transmitted over TCP (Cert and Kahn, 1974),
we use the standard TCP mechanisms for creating and
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terminating connections, each of which involves another
network round trip. This process is illustrated in Fig. 5:
the complete transaction involved in submitting a single
event to the broker, given a network round trip time of
tRT, takes 3tRT. In practice, after transmitting the final
fin packet, the author may assume that the connection is
closed without waiting for a response, and hence initiate a
new connection, so the figure of 2tRT describes the interval
between connection attempts. Assuming that events are
sent in sequentially, and given a round trip time of, say,
500 ms, this would limit the rate at which events can be
sent to 1 per second, or 43200 in a 12 hour period. This is
far short of the throughput discussed in §5.5, and certainly
inadequate for the putative 10 million alerts per night dis-
cussed above. This is a significant flaw in the VTP system.
It is to be hoped that future revisions can address the issue;
for further discussion, see §7.5.
Until and unless this problem is addressed, it is neces-
sary to consider alternative approaches. As discussed in
§5.5, it is possible for the author for an author to submit
multiple events simultaneously by opening more than one
TCP connection to the broker. Here, we investigate to
what extent this can mitigate the issue.
5.6.1. Test setup
Events were generated, sent the the broker, and thence
onward to a single subscriber as per §5.5.1, and was carried
out as described in that section. Connection counts were
again increased logarithmically. Given the relative stability
of the throughput (at least for modest connection counts)
shown in Fig 4, a single set of 10000 events was sent for
each level of concurrency.
Link-level network latency was simulated using NetEm
(Hemminger, 2005), the network emulation functionality
available as part of the Linux kernel. Given a (virtual, in
this case) network device named vethXXX, a delay of YYYms
may be added to each packet sent through it by running:
Note that this delay applies only to packets sent through
the interface: no delay is applied to packets received by the
interface. To simulate a symmetric network delay using
this approach, it would therefore be necessary to add a
latency of tRT/2 at both the author and the subscriber
interfaces. However, this is complicated in the test system
since the subscriber also communicates with the broker
over its interface. Therefore, instead the whole delay was
applied to the output of the author. Given the symmetric
nature of Fig. 5, the observed effect is identical.
5.6.2. Results
Figure 6 shows how the throughput varies with the
number of concurrent connections for a variety of network
round trip times. As expected, at low concurrencies, the
throughput is extremely low: the network round trip time
completely dominates the transmission rate. However, this
is substantially mitigated by increasing the concurrency:
with a round trip time of 100 ms, using 256 concurrent
connections provides a rate of 500 events/second, which
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Figure 5: The complete network packet exchange as an author uploads
a VOEvent to a broker. Packets with specific TCP flags set have those
flags indicated in upper case. Payload data (a VOEvent or Transport
packet) are indicated by the word “Payload”. Time increases down
the diagram. The network round trip time is denoted by tRT. A
dashed time axis indicates packets being sent with no interval between
them. For example, at time tRT the author sends ack immediately
followed by VOEvent data.
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Figure 6: Variation of throughput, as measured by the rate of events
received by the subscriber, as a function of number of concurrent
connections shown for a variety of network round trip times.
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approaches the peak rate achieved in in §5.5.2. At higher
concurrencies, though, the rate begins to diminish as the
load incurred in managing connections dominates, as seen
in §5.5.2.
A similar pattern is seen for other round trip delays:
increasing the number of connections can mitigate the
effects of network-induced latency. However, attempting
to initiate more than 512 connections always resulted in a
large number of events getting dropped in transit, as the
kernel refused to service so many simultaneous network
connections. Thus, the peak rates achieved at the higher
round-trip times were always suppressed relative to the
throughput measured with no latency. As discussed in
§5.5.2, appropriate tuning of the kernel networking stack
could be used to help overcome this issue; however, a better
approach would be to address it at the protocol level, an
idea to which we return in §7.
6. Authentication
For many applications involving VOEvents, it is impor-
tant to be certain of the authenticity of the event. That is,
to be able to guarantee that the event genuinely describes
the results of observations by its supposed author. This
is important both for event authors, to protect their rep-
utation for issuing high quality, trustworthy events, and
to subscribers, who cannot run the risk of using expensive
facilities chasing phantoms. While the overt motivation for
forging events is low—there is no obvious way to exploit a
VOEvent for monetary gain, for example—the potential for
mischief-makers to play havoc with event networks cannot
be ignored.
Two approaches may be taken to securing an event
distribution system. The first is to authenticate the trans-
port layer using a technology such as TLS (Dierks and
Rescorla, 2008). In this way, each entity involved would
be able to verify both the integrity of a VTP connection
and the identity of their remote peer. A subscriber could
therefore be certain of the identity of the broker from which
it receives a particular event. However, that broker was not
itself the originator of the event, but rather it received it
either from the author directly or from another broker: it is
now incumbent upon that broker to not only to verify the
identity of the sender but also to satisfy the subscriber that
this has been done with sufficient diligence. If the event
has traversed a length path through multiple brokers before
reaching the subscriber, this task becomes prohibitively
complex. As such, this is not a mechanism which VTP
supports.
The alternative is to authenticate individual VOEvent
packets. This can be done by applying a cryptographic
signature to the event using a technology such as OpenPGP
(Callas et al., 2007) or XML Digital Signatures (Bartel et al.,
2008). The recipient of an event can then verify that it is
identical to the event to which the signature was originally
applied.
Work has already been carried out on applying XML
Digital Signatures to VOEvents (Allen, 2008) outside the
framework of VTP. However, the implementation is rel-
atively complex: not only is there a paucity of libraries
providing a convenient implementation of the standard,
but even the library the authors chose to use20 required
source-level modification to meet their requirements.
On the other hand, both commercial and open-source
implementations of OpenPGP are widely available both as
stand-alone tools and with programming language inter-
faces. Furthermore, Denny (2008) describes a mechanism
for attaching an OpenPGP signature to a VOEvent with
specific reference to VTP. For these reasons, a prototype
version of Comet with OpenPGP support has been made
available for testing.
6.1. Implementation considerations
The OpenPGP standard itself is widely used and tested:
the basic cryptographic guarantees it provides are as close
to unimpeachable as it is reasonable to ask for. However,
there are three key hurdles which must be overcome before
it can be directly used in the context of VOEvents and
VTP.
6.1.1. Bitstream immutability
Section 3.2.3 discussed whether two VOEvent packets
can be regarded as “the same” and the motivated the re-
quirement that entities participating in a VTP network
should transmit events unchanged. When considering cryp-
tographic signatures, this requirement becomes absolutely
fundamental. The signature is applied to a particular collec-
tion of bits, with no semantic understanding of what those
bits represent. If a single bit is changed, the signature is
invalidated, even if that change does not alter the informa-
tion content of the document and however inconsequential
the change might be.
Beyond its direct requirements on the transport layer,
this could have implications for various uses to which VO-
Events may be put. For example, when storing an event in
an archival database, it would not be adequate to simply
extract the information from the packet and store that,
re-serializing it to XML if and when required. Rather,
it would be necessary for the archive to store the exact
bitstream to which a signature had been applied.
6.1.2. Event formatting
The original proposal described by Denny (2008) makes
use of the OpenPGP cleartext signature framework. How-
ever, as Callas et al. (2007, §7) makes clear, the cleartext
signature framework “is not intended to be reversible”: in
other words, applying such a signature may modify the
contents of the event packet itself. Such modifications are
generally insignificant (primarily concerning the way in
20XMLSec; http://www.aleksey.com/xmlsec/
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which lines starting with a “-”—the “hyphen-minus” char-
acter, Unicode code point U+002D—are handled), but,
nevertheless, we regard any mutation of the event data as
unacceptable.
To avoid these proposals, we suggest adopting a modifi-
cation of Denny’s proposal based on a detached signature
(Callas et al., 2007, §11.4) which is bundled with the VO-
Event. It is this modified proposal which is implemented
in Comet.
6.1.3. Trust model and key infrastructure
Any entity can generate an OpenPGP key with what-
ever identifying name they please and use it to apply a
signature to a document. The recipient of the document
has a strong guarantee that the document was genuinely
signed by the given key, but has no particular reason to
trust that the key was in the possession of a reputable entity
at the time the signature was made. At level, subverting
the system by signing VOEvents with valid-but-worthless
keys becomes a trivial exercise.
The most direct solution is for the owner of a key to
directly provide it to likely recipients in person or by some
other tamper-proof means of transmission. The recipient
then knows that this particular key belongs to that partic-
ular entity, and can take this into account when deciding
whether a signed event is genuine.
OpenPGP adopts extends this approach to the “web
of trust” model. Here, entities who have received a copy
of the key directly from its owner can themselves sign and
redistribute it. The recipients can they choose whether
they believe the intermediary to be trustworthy to warrant
the identity of the owner. The recipients may sign and
distribute the key further, eventually building up a web of
certified keys.
The same model may be applied to event packets them-
selves. Rather than simply checking for a valid signature
made by the author of the event, a legitimate approach
would be to check for a valid signature by any entity
which the recipient regards as trustworthy to guarantee
the packet’s authenticity. This could include, for example,
intermediate brokers or event aggregators. However, this
scheme is not provided for in the note by Denny, and has
the significant downside of much increased management
overhead, particularly when automatic response to gen-
uine events is required: the recipient must indicate which
entities they trust to sign events from which authors.
6.2. Usage in Comet
The released version of Comet at the time of writing
does not include support for OpenPGP based event au-
thentication. However, there is an experimental version
available which may be used for experimenting with these
technologies. See §8 for information on how to obtain both
released and experimental versions of Comet.
Comet provides comprehensive support for all the modes
in which event authentication may be used within VTP.
Specifically:
• When submitting to a broker, comet-sendvo can apply
a signature to the event being sent;
• When receiving an event from an author, the Comet
can be set to only accept events which are appropri-
ately signed;
• When receiving an event from a broker, Comet can
be set to only act upon and redistribute events which
are appropriately signed.
Comet also supports subscriber authentication by apply-
ing the same signing mechanisms to Transport documents
(§2). Using this technique:
• On receiving a connection from a subscriber, Comet
can request that the subscriber authenticate them-
selves by means of a signed Transport message, and
will then only distribute events to subscribers which
provide trustworthy signatures.
• When subscribing to a remote broker, Comet can
provide a signed Transport message in response to
an authentication request.
Comet’s OpenPGP support is based upon GnuPG21.
Comet does not provide any mechanism for managing the
configuration of GnuPG: instead, the standard GnuPG
tools should be used for this, and Comet inherits the con-
figuration and key database from them.
Of course, generating and verifying a cryptographic sig-
nature requires some numerical calculation. Furthermore,
for security reasons, directly linking GnuPG as a library in
application code is not supported. Handling cryptographic
operations in-process is therefore not possible. Instead, it
is necessary to fork a separate GnuPG process, incurring
additional overhead. Therefore, the impact of OpenPGP
support on Comet’s performance must be considered.
In practice, the overhead of signing an event is insignif-
icant: any one author is likely to be generating only a
limited number of events, and, even if that number is large,
they can trivially spread the load across multiple machines.
However, the Comet broker must check the signatures of all
events received: it is here that performance issues become
critical.
A simple test was performed to measure the time taken
to check the signature on a VOEvent packet. 1000 distinct
VOEvent packets of the form shown in Listing 5 were
generated and signed using the Comet codebase. Each
signature in turn was then checked for validity. The total
time taken to check all signatures on the system described
in §5.1 was 22.90 s, or around 0.023 s per event. This is
broadly comparable to values which might be expected due
to network latency, and is a factor of ∼ 3.6 greater than the
latency introduced by the Comet broker when not checking
a signature (§5.3.2). While not prohibitively expensive,
then, the overhead introduced by this technique cannot be
ignored by administrators of heavily-loaded brokers.
21http://gnupg.org/
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7. Future VOEvent and VTP revision
This manuscript has described both VTP itself and the
issues that have arisen when developing a specific imple-
mentation of it. From these considerations, five specific
recommendations for future evolution of the VOEvent and
VTP standards can be drawn. Some of these will be in-
corporated into a revised version of VTP which will be
submitted for IVOA standardization at a later date.
7.1. Event identity
Section 3.2.3 discussed the question of the identity of a
VOEvent. In particular, it considered whether two events
encoding identical information but in with a different (per-
haps only marginally) serialization could be regarded as
the same event. This is not well defined by the current
VOEvent standard (Seaman et al., 2011).
As discussed, the question of the identity of events is
important to the implementation of VTP networks. How-
ever, it is also of wider relevance: the VOEvent identifier
provides a convenient means to refer to a particular ce-
lestial transient in a variety of context, but can only be
reliably used as such if it is unambiguously defined.
7.2. Packet immutability
It is an implicit requirement of VTP and of event au-
thentication techniques based on OpenPGP signatures that
the bitstream of a packet must be unchanged by the pro-
cess of transmission over VTP. This requirement goes
beyond the straightforward requirement that the informa-
tion contained within an event must be unchanged. The
more stringent requirements of VTP are not explicit in the
current version of the protocol definition.
7.3. Event de-duplication
Section 3.2.3 described de-duplication to avoid loops on
a VTP network. This requirement is not explicit within
the current VTP definition. Comet has demonstrated an
effective approach to this problem building upon §§7.1 and
7.2.
7.4. Filtering
Section 4 demonstrated that the design of VTP is easily
extensible to accommodate relatively complex broker-side
filtering capabilities. However, the implementation of these
filters in Comet requires a non-standard extension to the
protocol. Future VTP revisions should consider a formal-
ized means of enabling brokers to advertise what filtering
capabilities they are capable of providing, if any, and for
subscribers to specify any filters required.
7.5. Bulk event submission
Section 5 demonstrated that Comet was capable of
receiving and distributing large numbers of events with rel-
atively low latency. However, §§5.5 and 5.6 demonstrated
that the major limiting factor on performance, in partic-
ular in the case of high network round trip times, is the
requirement that each individual event submission by an
author take place over a new TCP connection.
Two approaches should be considered to this flaw in the
protocol. The first is simply to drop the requirement that
the connection should be closed between each submission.
Not only would this reduce the total transaction time per
event by removing the need to repeat the TCP handshake
(see Fig. 5), it would also be possible to interleave trans-
actions: the author could begin the submission of further
events before having received an acknowledgement of the
first.
The alternative approach is to group batches of events
into a single data structure (a “container”), and transmit
that over VTP in a single transaction. The definition of a
container format for VOEvents is already under discussion
in the context of the IVOA22.
8. Availability
Comet is freely available, open source software released
under a two-clause BSD-style23 license. It includes a com-
prehensive test suite and documentation. It is developed us-
ing a public code repository; contributions and bug reports
are actively solicited. Further details, including download
and installation instructions, are available from the project
website24.
All materials used to generate this manuscript, includ-
ing the Docker configuration, benchmarking scripts, and
latency measurement plugin are available from the Comet
repository.
9. Conclusions
The VOEvent Transport Protocol is an intentionally
minimal mechanism for distributing notifications of tran-
sient celestial events in the form of VOEvent messages.
Comet has been developed to implement all the core as-
pects of VTP. It is production-ready software, and is
freely available and ready to be integrated into a variety
of scientific projects.
This manuscript has described how Comet has been
designed to meet the requirements of VTP based upon an
asynchronous, event-driven style of programming. This
has made it possible to provide a robust, high-performance
and easily extensible implementation of the protocol. The
22http://www.ivoa.net/forum/voevent/2013-November/002914.
html
23http://opensource.org/licenses/BSD-2-Clause
24http://comet.transientskp.org/
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development of Comet cast light on a number of areas
of the protocol and of the wider VOEvent infrastructure
where additional clarity and specification is required.
Using Comet as a test-bed, we have investigated the
performance characteristics of VTP under a variety of
conditions. Our results demonstrate that VTP is broadly
capable of meeting the anticipated requirements of the
next generation of large scale transient survey projects.
However, there are deficiencies in the design of the protocol
which adversely affect its perfomance. We have discussed
how future revisions of VTP could address these problems.
We have also shown a prototype of a highly-configurable
event filtering system which will enable end users to sift
through high-volume event streams and receive only those
events which are of relevance to their own scientific goals.
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